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Abstract: This paper considers how the “true” common monetary policy that is con-
ducted by the ECB under various sources of uncertainty will differ from the policy
that was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty, and how the uncertainties may induce a
representative government to criticise the common monetary policy. Acquiring in-
formation about the transmission mechanism, and revealing that information as well
as information about the ECB reaction function, is incentive compatible for the ECB
both directly and indirectly. The direct effect means that the ECB’s own welfare is
decreasing in uncertainties. The indirect effect arises because less uncertainty re-
duces the risk of criticism from the individual governments’ side. The risk of criti-
cism is the larger, and consequently the indirect incentive to reduce uncertainty is the
higher, the larger are the leftward shifts in national political preferences from those
that prevailed when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. The model also provides an
explanation for the ECB’s choice of monetary policy strategy that incorporates ele-
ments of both monetary targeting and inflation targeting.
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1 Introduction
The last months before the introduction of the EMU third stage witnessed some pub-
lic debate and controversy about the operational mode and openness of the European
Central Bank. In particular, following the victory of the left in the German elections,
there have been demands that the ECB should shift towards a more employment-
oriented policy. Moreover, several observers have argued that the ECB should be
made more accountable and that it should reveal information about its forecasts and
meetings, including the voting record. Finally, the ECB’s choice of a monetary pol-
icy strategy has attracted criticism. The ECB decided to opt for a strategy that con-
stitutes a mixture between pure monetary targeting and direct inflation targeting
strategies, in order to minimise the uncertainty in conduct of monetary policy. How-
ever, such a strategy has been considered as blurred from the public’s point of view,
making it harder to monitor the actions of the ECB.
In this paper we try to analyse whether uncertainty about the ECB’s policy, and/or a
shift in the political preferences in a representative country that participates in EMU,
may act as a catalyst for the representative government to criticise the ECB and to
take initiatives to change its policies. More specifically, we look at the representative
government’s problem when it considers the prospective gains and losses from the
future EMU and derive first an incentive compatibility condition that must have been
met in order to make signing the Maastricht Treaty possible. We then consider how
the “true” policy that is conducted by the ECB under various sources of uncertainty
will differ from the policy that was agreed in the Treaty, and how these uncertainties
affect the representative government’s incentive compatibility constraint. It turns out,
that if the wage setters in the EMU area are uncertain about the extent to which the
ECB’s preferences between inflation and output will deviate from those implicitly
stated in the Maastricht Treaty, the representative government’s welfare in EMU
may easily turn negative. The same result applies if there is uncertainty about the
monetary transmission mechanism in EMU that was not fully anticipated at the time
when the Treaty was signed. Most interestingly, however, the distortions from the
different sources of uncertainty are exaggerated if there is a shift in the representative3
government’s preferences towards more output and employment friendly policies
between the date when the Treaty was signed and the date when the EMU third stage
begins. Including two sources of uncertainty also allows us to find a possible expla-
nation for the ECB’s choice of a “mixed” monetary policy strategy. Under plausible
parameter values, the ECB is more sensitive to uncertainty in the transmission
mechanism relative to the effects that arise from preference uncertainty, than is the
representative government. Because the ECB was allowed to choose its own strategy
it clearly preferred a strategy that provides more information about the transmission
mechanism and was willing to sacrifice some accountability in exchange to that gain.
The model leads to two tentative policy recommendations. If the ECB wants to avoid
criticism from the individual governments’ side, it should  1) continue to invest in
good forecasts and improve its knowledge about the transmission mechanism  2) re-
veal information about its view on the features of the transmission mechanism as
well as other information that can be used by the private sector to determine the
ECB’s reaction function (such as the minutes of the meetings of the ECB council).
These actions seem to be even more urgent in situations where there has been a shift
to the left in the political balance in the participating countries. Of course, these con-
clusions only consider the case of eliminating incentives to rebel against the common
monetary policy. There may be other reasons why forecasts and minutes should not
be fully disclosed.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 derives the equilibrium policy outcome
for the representative government outside EMU. Section 3 analyses the conditions
that made it incentive compatible for the government to sign the Maastricht Treaty.
Section 4 studies how the “true” policy under the ECB differs from the predicted
“Maastricht policy”, and how different sources of uncertainty affect the ECB’s and
the representative government’s incentives. Section 5 concludes.4
2 Outcome under National Monetary Policy
We start with deriving a representative country’s equilibrium welfare under purely
national monetary policy. This standard outcome will serve as the benchmark the
representative government uses when it evaluates the welfare consequences of join-
ing EMU and delegating monetary policy to the ECB.
The macroeconomic equilibrium is described by means of a Barro and Gordon
(1983) -type game between the wage-setting private sector and the government who
acts as a monetary authority. We abstract here from policy delegation issues on the
national level, and do not consider the design of optimal national central bank insti-
tutions. In other words, we assume that under national policymaking the best possi-
ble equilibrium is characterised by equations (1)-(6) below. The representative econ-
omy’s output is generated according to the following Lucas supply function:
N
e z y + − = π π (1)
In (1), y denotes output, π  is the inflation rate, π
e is expected inflation (formed by the
private sector one period earlier and defined as π
e = Et-1(π )), and zN is a stochastic
national output shock with E(zN)=0 and VAR(zN)=σ ZN
2. In the absence of shocks and
policy surprises, i.e. when π =π
e, output is at the natural rate which for simplicity is
set equal to zero.
Given the supply function, the government intends to choose the money supply m in
order to minimise a standard loss function that is quadratic in both output and infla-
tion. We assume that the economy’s transmission mechanism is fully known and
such that government can directly control the inflation rate by changing money sup-
ply. Therefore, m=π  for the representative government outside EMU, and the loss is
given by:5
} ) ( {
2
1 2 2 y y LN − + = λ π .( 2 )
In (2), the parameter λ  illustrates the relative weight assigned by the government on
the respective policy objectives. The private sector knows the government’s prefer-
ences, i.e. there is no uncertainty about λ . Together with the assumption that the
transmission mechanism is known, this could reflect a situation where the economy’s
political and economic features have become familiar to the different parties of the
economy, perhaps over a longer period of time. The standard time-inconsistency
problem is here captured by the fact that y, government’s target level of output, is
higher than the natural rate and therefore whenever λ >0, government has an incen-
tive to generate policy surprises.
Under discretionary monetary policy, the timing of events is as follows. (i) The pri-
vate sector rationally forms inflationary expectations. (ii) The output shock is real-
ised. (iii) Government chooses the money growth rate (inflation rate), after observing
the shock and taking the expectations as given. Minimising (2) with respect to π  and
subject to (1) gives the following first-order condition:
0 ) ( = − + − + y zN
e π π λ π (3)
Under rational expectations, π
e=π . Using this condition, and remembering that the
private sector does not observe zN, we get the following expression for expected in-
flation:
y
e λ π = (4)
Substituting (4) back into (3), and rearranging, gives the equilibrium inflation rate
under national monetary policy. Using this expression, and equation (4), in (1), gives



















The optimal inflation rate consists of an average inflation part, which reflects infla-
tionary expectations under discretion, and a stochastic part that shows how govern-
ment partially stabilises the output shock. Output deviates from the natural rate only
because the shock is not fully stabilised. Therefore, the positive average inflation
rate, or the inflation bias, is purely distortionary in that it does not generate any in-
crease in the average output. In the absence of a commitment technology, govern-
ment is not able to avoid this problem in so far as it has a positive output target and
the private sector is rational.
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Clearly, when λ =0, the government’s loss is equal to zero. Whenever λ >0, the gov-
ernment faces a trade-off between the two objectives it is trying to control simultane-
ously with its single instrument, the money growth rate. We now turn to analyse the
issues the representative government needs to take into account when it considers its
welfare in EMU.7
3 European Monetary Union According to the
Maastricht Treaty
When signing the Maastricht Treaty, the governments of the European Union con-
firmed the agreement about the rules and the framework for the common monetary
policy (CMP) and the tasks and priorities of the European Central Bank (ECB). In
this section we follow the model of Alesina and Grilli (1993) and analyse the gain
from EMU the representative country was expecting to achieve when it was to sign
the Treaty. Clearly, this expected gain was based on the design of EMU as it is stated
in the Treaty. In the following section, we study how this hypothetical gain is likely
to differ from the “true” gain that can be achieved when the ECB takes over the
CMP.
The Maastricht Treaty states that the CMP must be set according to average eco-
nomic developments in the EMU area as a whole. Therefore, the Treaty assumes that
the CMP is set subject to the following “European” output function:
E
e
E E E z y + − = π π (7)
In (7), π E is the inflation rate chosen in EMU and zE is a “European” output shock
that can be characterised as a weighed average of all national output disturbances.
We assume that when signing the Treaty the governments expected the future ECB
to have full control of monetary policy, i.e. that by changing money supply the ECB
would be able to directly control the inflation rate. Finally, because it defines the
statute of the ECB, we can say that the Treaty implicitly draws the following “Euro-
pean” objective function the ECB is supposed to minimise:8
} ) ( {
2
1 2 2 y y L E E E − + = µ π (8)
For simplicity, the common output target is assumed to be identical to y, the output
target of the individual government in (2). The parameter µ  illustrates the weight the
Treaty assigns on the output objective relative to the inflation objective. By the time
of signing the Treaty the participating countries had agreed upon the ECB’s statute
which implicitly determines the value of µ . Alesina and Grilli (1993) analysed this
bargaining process and found that in order to make EMU incentive compatible to the
country with most credible national low-inflation policy, the preferences of the ECB
should be at least as conservative as those of that particular country.
2 The ECB stat-
ute reflects this interpretation rather well. While attempting to make EMU incentive
compatible for Germany, it states that the ECB shall be highly independent and that
its primary objective is price stability, which formulations closely follow the spirit of
the Bundesbank law. In terms of equation (8), the Maastricht Treaty would thus set
parameter µ  close to zero.
Following the same steps than under national monetary policy above the equilibrium
inflation and output rates that, according to the Treaty, are expected to result in EMU



















The Community’s equilibrium welfare loss in EMU can be achieved by substituting
(9a,b) into (8):
                                                
2 In the context of policy delegation games, “conservative” preferences amount to putting a low rela-
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On the other hand, the equilibrium welfare loss the Treaty should deliver to the rep-
resentative country can be obtained by first substituting the common inflation rate
(9a) into the national output function (1) and then substituting the resulting expres-
sion together with (9a) into equation (2):



























,        (11)
In (11), ρ  is the correlation coefficient between the national shock and the European
shock. In addition, we have included a constant parameter K that roughly captures all
the indisputable microeconomic gains and political ego-rents the representative gov-
ernment expects to receive when joining EMU. We argue that including these ef-
fects, even in a very abstract manner, is an important component of the analysis of
the welfare effects from a monetary union between politically and economically
asymmetric countries who do not necessarily form an optimal currency area. Finally,
the expected gain for the representative country from signing the Maastricht Treaty
can be obtained as the difference between the equilibrium welfare losses outside and
inside the EMU (equations (6) and (11)):
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From the term inside the first squared brackets of (12) it can be seen that in terms of
average welfare, the representative country is the better off the more conservative the
Treaty makes the ECB to be (i.e. the lower is µ  relative to λ ). However, a lower µ
also leads to insufficient stabilisation of the common output shock zE, and therefore
the model gives rise to the familiar trade-off between credibility and flexibility (as in
Rogoff, 1985). From the representative government’s point of view, the optimal de-10
gree of ECB conservativeness, µ *, can therefore be defined as a solution to the fol-
lowing equality, which follows from the first derivative of (12) wrt. µ :
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If replacing µ  with λ  in (13) renders the LHS larger than the RHS, then the repre-
sentative government wants that the CMP is conducted by a ECB with more conser-
vative, but not infinitely more conservative, preferences than those of the govern-










, and because λ >µ  by definition, it
holds that µ *, the optimal ECB preferences, should satisfy 0<µ *<λ .
The question clearly arises how the most conservative of the participating countries
can be made to sign the Treaty (assuming that the ECB cannot be more conservative
than the most conservative participating government). Indeed, if we set µ =λ =λ m,
where λ m denotes the preferences of the most conservative government, it follows
that the most conservative government’s gain from EMU is always negative except
in the case where zN=zE and ρ =1 (in which case GN,E=0). Therefore, whenever the
variances of the output shocks are different and /or there is incomplete correlation
between the shocks, the most conservative country is better off by staying outside the
EMU even if the ECB adopted that country’s own political preferences. However, if
the additional gains captured by K are sufficiently large the country may still find it
incentive compatible to sign the Treaty and join EMU under economic and political
asymmetries.
After rearranging equation (12) we find that for the representative country with λ >µ ,
the incentive compatibility constraint that must have been met before it was possible
to sign the Treaty is given as follows:11
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We call (14) the no-rebelling constraint. The reason is as follows. If the political or
economic conditions in the representative country change after it signed the Maas-
tricht Treaty (i.e., λ  or zN change), inequality (14) may no longer hold. Assuming that
leaving EMU is too costly an option, the government then has an incentive to push
for changes in the CMP so that the policy would better reflect the new circumstances
in the representative country. From (14) it can be seen that an increase in λ , reflect-
ing a shift in government preferences from a low inflation policy towards more effi-
cient output and employment stabilisation, increases the first two terms in the RHS,
making it more likely that the no-rebelling constraint is violated. Of course, such a
shift in preferences simultaneously increases the gain from the credible low inflation
policy (by increasing the LHS of (14)). However, for sufficiently high values of λ  the
loss from too little stabilisation outweighs the gain from lower average inflation (as
was shown by Rogoff), and the government prefers a higher µ  that makes the CMP
more accommodative. In addition, increased variance of the shocks (and/or a reduc-
tion in their correlation) from the time when the Treaty was signed may bring around
additional losses that make the RHS of (14) larger than the LHS. In that case the rep-
resentative government clearly wants the definition of zE to be changed so that it
better reflects the characteristics of zN.
We now turn to analyse how the no-rebelling constraint is affected by the fact that
the “true” EMU can not necessarily be described as equations (7)-(14) above. More
specifically, we analyse the effects of uncertainties about the preferences of the ECB
as well as about the link between money supply and inflation in the EMU.12
4 Uncertainty and Incentives to Rebel against the
ECB
In reality, monetary policy is always conducted under various degrees of uncertainty.
This is especially the case after regime shifts, for example when policy has been
delegated to a new institution whose preferences and operational environment is not
yet completely known.
We assume that the “true” monetary policy under the ECB differs from the policy
agreed in the Maastricht Treaty in two important respects. First, it is assumed that the
ECB has only incomplete control of the inflation rate through its monetary instru-
ment. This may be because there is incomplete knowledge about the EMU -wide
monetary policy transmission mechanism. Second, we incorporate the fact that the
ECB’s preferences are not completely known to the public. The public observes the
parameter µ  that is implicitly given in the Maastricht Treaty, but because the Treaty
is an incomplete contract there exists uncertainty about the extent to which the
ECB’s real preferences may deviate from the agreed preferences. Such uncertainty is
likely to be particularly significant in the early stages of EMU. The modifications we
make to the previous subsection (the Maastricht case) can be described as follows:
2 ) ( , 0 ) ( , ˆ X E x VAR x E x m σ π = = + = ,           (15)
2 ) ( , 0 ) ( , ˆ ε σ ε ε ε µ µ = = + = VAR E
In (15), x is a stochastic shock that is realised after the inflationary expectations are
formed and is therefore known to the ECB at the time when policy is set (like the
output shocks zN and zE). On the other hand, ε  shows that at any particular point in
time, the ECB may either be too conservative or advocate a too loose monetary
stance compared to the average preferences µ ˆ . Nolan and Schaling (1996) interpret
σ ε
2 as measuring the inverse of central bank accountability since a low σ ε
2 reduces13
uncertainty about monetary policy outcomes. We assume that there is no correlation
between x and ε .
The ECB confronts the “European” output function (7), and its objective function is
the same than (8), except to the modifications which are illustrated in (15). The
ECB’s first order condition is now given by:
0 ) ˆ ( ˆ = − + − + + + y z x m x m E
e
E π µ .           (16)
Taking expectations across (16) is slightly more complicated than in the standard
case, due to the multiplicative uncertainty that is brought around by µ . As in Nolan
and Schaling, by using a Taylor series expansion and applying rational expectations
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Substituting (17) back into (16), and rearranging, yields the “true” equilibrium
money growth rate, the ECB’s policy instrument. Using this and (17) in (7) gives the




) ˆ 1 (







































x z y F m a
E E
E E
          (18)
When there is no uncertainty about the ECB’s preferences (σ ε
2→ 0) it follows that
F→µ . Substituting (18a,b) into (8) gives the ECB’s welfare loss when the public
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Equation (19) gives the interesting result that in equilibrium, the ECB’s welfare loss
is increasing in σ ε
2. Therefore, it is in the ECB’s own interest to reveal information
about the factors that help to reduce σ ε
2, the public’s uncertainty about the ECB’s
preferences. In that sense equation (19) also provides some intuition for the argu-
ments that the ECB should have closely mimicked the functions and procedures of
the Bundesbank. That would have been one way to reduce the distortions caused by
preference uncertainty σ ε
2 and thereby improve ECB’s own welfare. Moreover, the
ECB also has an interest to improve its ability to control the inflation rate (which
amounts to reducing σ x
2).
However, we are more interested in the welfare results that concern the representa-
tive government. The representative country’s welfare loss under “true” ECB policy
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Clearly, the loss of the representative government is also increasing in uncertainty
about both the ECB preferences and the transmission mechanism. Comparing equa-
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When (21a) holds, transmission uncertainty (x-uncertainty) increases ECB’s loss
more than preference uncertainty (ε -uncertainty). On the other hand, when (21b)
holds, preference uncertainty is more damaging for the representative government
than transmission uncertainty. Finally, under the parameter values shown in condi-
tion (21c) the ECB is more sensitive to transmission uncertainty relative to prefer-
ence uncertainty than the representative government. This result is more likely to
hold if λ  is not too large. Therefore, when (21a) holds, the ECB is more eager to
choose a monetary policy strategy that is effective to reduce σ x
2. In order to achieve
that goal it may even be willing to sacrifice some accountability in terms of allowing
a higher σ ε
2, even if the representative government would have preferred a strategy
that puts more weight on reducing σ ε
2 (condition 21c). This result is because trans-
mission uncertainty has a greater impact on the part of the loss that arises from infla-
tion being off its target than the loss from too low output. In contrast, preference un-
certainty increases the output part of the loss relatively more than the inflation part.
Since the ECB puts more weight on the inflation objective than the representative16
government, it suffers more from distortions to the equilibrium inflation rate. The
wish to acquire as much information as possible about the EMU-wide transmission
mechanism could explain why the ECB decided to adopt a strategy that constitutes a
mixture between a monetary targeting strategy and an inflation targeting strategy.
According to many critics, even though a mixed strategy may provide more informa-
tion about the trends and developments of the economy, a single policy target could
have been a more effective way of reducing the public’s uncertainty about the ECB’s
preferences.
Finally, by calculating the difference between (6) and (20) we get the representative
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From (22), we can calculate how the optimal degree of ECB conservativeness
changes due to the various sources of uncertainties:
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It turns out, that transmission uncertainty does not affect the optimal choice of µ .
However, increased preference uncertainty increases the LHS of (23). Therefore, in
order to offset the additional bias in inflation expectations which results from the
preference uncertainty, for a given λ  the representative government would like to ap-
point a more conservative ECB than what was agreed in the absence of uncertainty.
Finally, the no-rebelling constraint under “true” ECB policy is given as follows:17
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The effects of uncertainty on the no-rebelling constraint can be summarised as fol-
lows. The higher is uncertainty about the monetary transmission mechanism (as
captured by σ X
2), the more likely it is that the government wants a change in the ECB
policy. In addition, since the second term in the squared brackets in the LHS of (24)
is greater than µ
2 whenever F>µ , it follows that increased uncertainty about the
ECB’s preferences also encourages the government to rebel against the Maastricht
rules (see equation 23 as well). Most interestingly, however, the negative effects
caused by uncertainties are the stronger the higher is the weight assigned by the rep-
resentative government on the output objective. A shift in political preferences to-
wards a more output and employment oriented policy therefore exaggerates the
problems arising from uncertainty in the common monetary policy, making rebelling
a more tempting option.
The effects of changes in the representative government’s preferences and in uncer-
tainty about the ECB’s preferences are illustrated in Figure 1. There we use numeri-
cal simulation to plot the no-rebelling constraint (24). The solid curve illustrates the
LHS of equation 24, and the dashed curve shows the RHS. Both curves are increas-
ing in λ , the government’s weight on output. Whenever the dashed curve lies above
the solid curve, the representative government does best by trying to act for changes
in ECB’s policy. When uncertainty increases, meaning that σ ε
2 and σ X
2 go up, the
intercept of the two curves shifts to the left like in Figure 1b. Hence, the critical level
of λ  where criticising the common monetary policy becomes optimal is decreasing in
uncertainty.18
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This paper used the methods of time-consistent monetary policy games to illustrate
the potential losses for a representative government from monetary policy uncer-
tainty in EMU. Our results showed that acquiring information about the transmission
mechanism, and revealing that information as well as information about the “true”
ECB reaction function, is incentive compatible for the ECB both directly and indi-
rectly. The direct effect is due to the fact that the ECB’s own welfare loss in in-
creasing in uncertainties. The indirect effect arises because less uncertainty reduces
the risk of criticism from the individual governments’ side. The risk of criticism is
the larger, and consequently the indirect incentive to reduce uncertainty is the higher,
the larger are the leftward shifts in national political preferences from those that pre-
vailed when the Maastricht Treaty was agreed. Our model also gives a possible ex-
planation to why the ECB decided to adopt a strategy that is more effective from the
point of view of providing information about the transmission mechanism than a
strategy that would have been more effective in terms of reducing uncertainty about
the ECB’s preferences.19
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